The commission was created on 28 October 2025 by the UDR, an ally of the Rassemblement National, as part of its annual right of allocation. The rapporteur, Charles Alloncle, is from the UDR. The chair, Jérémie Patrier-Leitus, is a Horizons (centrist) MP from Calvados. The two men agree on almost nothing. The latter published, as an introduction to Volume 1, twenty pages of carefully worded but firm distancing from the rapporteur’s approach, whom he accuses of seeking to “prepare minds for the privatisation of public broadcasting.”

67 hearings, 234 sworn witnesses, 150 hours of proceedings broadcast live, and a 551-page report submitted on 27 April 2026 so that what we already knew might finally be written down.

The report establishes facts that sketch the portrait of a media apparatus funded by everyone, meant to represent everyone, but whose actual functioning has been captured to serve a structured political discourse, shaped over time by now-identified networks.

I. Governance under influence: the making of leadership

The first layer is institutional.

In January 2013, François Hollande, President of the Republic (Socialist Party, left), appointed one of his supporters, Olivier Schrameck, to head the CSA, despite his lack of objective expertise in the field. The CSA was then the public regulator of the media in France (now replaced by Arcom). According to Mediapart, the appointment was reportedly supported by David Kessler, a culture adviser at the Élysée and a senior civil servant close to Socialist circles. The same day, Claude Bartolone, then President of the National Assembly (and a central figure of the Socialist Party), appointed Sylvie Pierre-Brossolette to the CSA, described as close to Schrameck.

In 2014, Delphine Ernotte’s sister joined Anne Hidalgo’s municipal team, Mayor of Paris (Socialist Party, left). At the same time, Robert Zarader, a communications strategist close to François Hollande, supported Ernotte’s candidacy while she was a senior executive at Orange, a private telecoms group. At the end of 2014, David Kessler left the Élysée and joined Orange, where he actively supported this candidacy.

In April 2015, during the selection process, Olivier Schrameck unilaterally changed the pre-selection rules within the CSA. Despite internal concerns, the procedure continued. On 21–22 April 2015, Delphine Ernotte was appointed President of France Télévisions, the main French public broadcasting group (comparable to a BBC-type public service broadcaster).

She then appointed Stéphane Sitbon-Gomez as chief of staff, coming from political activism (green-left and socialist circles), who would gradually become one of the group’s key editorial decision-makers, eventually overseeing in 2026 a large part of the strategy and journalists of public broadcasting, without prior journalistic experience. Schrameck acknowledges having spoken with François Hollande before the decision, with the latter expressing reservations about other candidates, while denying any pressure.

Presented as independent, the authority thus appears aligned, through its rules, appointments, and decisions, with the Socialist executive of the time. This weakens its real independence and reveals a systemic functioning that remains active.

II. The double standard in ethics

The second layer concerns the rules as applied.

The case of Patrick Cohen and Thomas Legrand is central: filmed in September 2025 with Socialist Party officials, they discuss municipal elections and Rachida Dati’s candidacy, stating “we do what it takes for Dati, Patrick and me.” No sanctions. No remorse.

By contrast, Jean-François Achilli was removed in 2024 over a mere rumour of a lunch with Jordan Bardella. Institutional justifications invoke context or silence from one of the parties involved. But the report notes an asymmetry: sanctions do not depend on facts, but on the political sensitivity of those involved. The result is a two-tier system, where ethics become variable depending on the camp.

III. Open activism on air

The third layer concerns editorial content.

While top management was co-opted, on-air content itself became openly activist, without consequences.

The case of Diane Saint-Réquier, contributor to France TV Slash between 2018 and 2022, is striking. On her Twitter account linked to her work for the public service platform, funded by taxpayers and explicitly aimed at minors, she posted:

Her Twitter bio displayed the acronym ACAB (“All Cops Are Bastards”) since 19 September 2019.

Another example is Merwane Benlazar, a columnist on France Inter, following a similar logic. He wrote to a woman on X :

France TV Slash itself reportedly claims internally that it no longer represents France “as it is, but as we would like it to be.” The report sees here a shift: from public service broadcasting to an instrument of ideological transformation.

IV. The ecosystem of ideological validation

The fourth layer is more diffuse but structural.

The report documents the editorial choice of entrusting France Culture’s press review to Nora Hamadi, whose far-left political engagements are public.

It also highlights the fact-checking unit, presented as a guarantor of factual verification, but whose editorial choices reveal partisan alignment.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF), an international organisation presenting itself as non-partisan and widely used as a moral reference, is also scrutinised. While its charter claims neutrality, its petitions tell a different story. RSF is nevertheless used by public broadcasters and aligned media as a guarantee of neutrality. The report concludes that this guarantee does not hold.

The issue is not incidental. The system operates through successive layers of validation: journalist verification, editorial arbitration, ethics committees, regulatory oversight, international NGO legitimacy. Each layer is biased in the same direction. It is an apparatus. And an apparatus cannot be reformed from within, because its agents are precisely those who built it.

V. France Médias Monde and strategic inversion

The fifth layer is less frequently discussed.

France Médias Monde, which includes France 24, RFI, and Monte Carlo Doualiya, has an annual budget of nearly €300 million to project France’s voice globally.

The report documents several cases of broadcasts on these channels containing rhetoric hostile to France itself. Ambassador Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, quoted in hearings, asked in striking terms: “How do you expect us to fight anti-French discourse when your own channels broadcast it?”

She named Alain Foka and Claudy Siar, journalist and host of the programme Couleurs tropicales on RFI, who notably compared Rima Hassan to Nelson Mandela and accused “French journalism” of “collaboration” with what he called “21st-century fascism.”

French public broadcasting, through a form of ethnomasochism, accepts this inversion. Yet the report recalls the stakes: in a context of information warfare where influence media invest heavily, particularly in Francophone Africa, the editorial weakening of one of France’s only instruments is a strategic failure. External public broadcasting is not a neutral space. It is a weapon that is being turned against its owner.

VI. The outsourcing economy

The sixth layer is perhaps the most structurally important for understanding the system.

France Télévisions outsources a massive share of its programming to private producers. The result is an oligopoly. Three groups, Mediawan, Banijay, Together Media, capture most contracts. Tacit renewals have replaced calls for tender. Margins are opaque. So are the remuneration schemes of presenter-producers.

The “presenter-producer” system is itself a glaring anomaly: a television host simultaneously runs the company producing the very show they present. In the same week, they are a public service employee, the head of a private company billing the public broadcaster, and a public-facing figure presented as independent on air. Conflicts of interest are no longer to be prevented; they are embedded in the structure.

The report documents movement of executives between public broadcasting leadership and private production companies, noting a “normalisation of conflict-of-interest situations.”

And what are the ethics committees doing?

The ethics committee of France Télévisions has issued nine opinions since its creation in 2017, nine in eight years for France’s largest public broadcaster. Its annual report sometimes fits on a single sheet of paper.

VII. The upstream factory: schools and elite reproduction

The seventh layer may be the most structural of all, because it operates upstream of the system.

The report documents a chronic lack of pluralism among guest lecturers in journalism schools. These schools train those who will later shape newsrooms, and ultimately public opinion.

If lecturers overwhelmingly come from the same editorial camp, and if the professional norms they transmit systematically exclude certain perspectives, the result will not be visible in any single newsroom at any given moment. It will appear, over a generation, in the homogeneity of the entire media landscape.

Cohen, Legrand, Saint-Réquier, Benlazar are not accidents: they are products of a “woke” training system that selects and shapes convergent profiles. Gramscian metapolitics says nothing else: the battle for institutions is won in schools, long before it reaches newsrooms. The left understood this very well.

What remains

The Alloncle report has inscribed into parliamentary procedure what had until now been dismissed as right-wing grievance. These 234 sworn testimonies, 150 hours of public hearings, and 551 pages published after parliamentary debate will not disappear. They will remain, as a historical object, as a marker, as a reference point from which any future discussion on public broadcasting must begin.

We pay, through our taxes, without explicit consent, approximately €4.2 per month per citizen for a public service which, in its current configuration, functions as a system that acts against us and does not represent us.

The argument is now documented. What is done with it is a political decision.

But after reading the Alloncle report, no one should come and claim that there is no left-leaning ecosystem promoting hatred and falsehoods against its own people.

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On April 28, 2026, one of the most closely watched politicians in Europe spoke for four and a half hours, without interruption, on the ungeskriptet channel run by German podcaster Ben Berndt. Seventy thousand people liked the video overnight. Der Spiegel and Berliner Zeitung immediately called it a scandal. The unspeakable had been allowed to present himself as a human being. The mainstream press followed with the same outrage.

The format itself matters. In Germany, Björn Höcke is what Berndt calls, without irony, the Voldemort of politics. The man whose name is not spoken. He has been convicted for using a slogan, kept off TV panels, and even blocked by parliamentary decision from presiding over the opening session of the Thuringian parliament, although he leads its largest group. No one had ever let him speak for this long.

That alone is enough to make the moment worth paying attention to.

But there is something else. Beyond the controversy, this kind of format allows something rare. A politician taking the time to lay out the intellectual foundations of what he believes. If you want to understand where parts of the German right stand today, or more broadly where European politics might be heading, this is not something you usually get to see.

Höcke remains, in any case, the untouchable man of an untouchable party. Maybe that is precisely why it is worth looking a little more closely. Voxeuropa offers here a portrait of Europe’s most controversial political figure.

The man whose name is not spoken

A bit of context is necessary.

Björn Höcke, born in 1972 in Rhineland, has led since 2014 the Thuringian branch of the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), a party founded in 2013 in opposition to Angela Merkel’s European policy. Since then, it has become one of the main political forces on the German right.

Thuringia, in the former East Germany, marked a turning point in September 2024. For the first time, the AfD came first in a regional election, with 32.8 percent of the vote. Höcke now leads the largest parliamentary group in that regional assembly.

And yet, he has never held executive power.

The reason is the Brandmauer, the “firewall.” A strict rule followed by other parties: no cooperation with the AfD, at any level, on any issue. It comes from Germany’s historical memory, and over time it has become something close to doctrine. The AfD will not govern. And Höcke, even less so than the others.

There is also the legal aspect.

Höcke was convicted twice, in 2024 and again on appeal, for using the slogan Alles für Deutschland (“Everything for Germany”). German courts ruled that the phrase had been used by the SA in the 1930s and that, as a trained history teacher, he could not have been unaware of it. He insists he acted in good faith, pointing out that the same words appear on war memorials that predate Nazism.

During the interview, he comes back to this point repeatedly, almost like a fixed reference:

“I have a criminal record for a thought crime that does not exist in any other country in the world.”

No Western country has a direct equivalent. Legally, the discussion is still open. Politically, it is not. He has a record, and it is used.

There is more.

Germany’s domestic intelligence service, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, has classified the AfD’s Thuringian branch as “proven right-wing extremist.” Höcke lives under permanent police protection. When he arrives for the interview, several security teams are with him.

Ben Berndt jokes:

“It doesn’t smell of sulfur yet, even though I’ve already been in this room for a few minutes.”

That is the strange effect surrounding him. A kind of constructed aura. Something close to a spell.

The teacher from Hesse

If you look past the media image, the background is much more ordinary than you might expect.

Höcke comes from a family of refugees from East Prussia. He grew up in Westphalia, studied history and sports, and became a teacher. In 2008, he started working in a secondary school in Hesse known for being difficult, with a high proportion of students from immigrant backgrounds.

At the same time, his private life settles into something stable. He is married, has four children, and moves to Thuringia, where he lives in a 500-year-old listed farmhouse. When he talks about those years, he describes a fairly typical middle-class life.

The turning point, according to him, happens at school.

He teaches German to children who do not speak it. He simplifies materials so they can follow. He watches tensions between groups, especially between Turkish and Kurdish students, play out again and again in the schoolyard.

At some point, it becomes too much.

“I can’t take it anymore. I have to change schools.”

Politics comes later, and not all at once. He joins the CDU’s youth organization, the Junge Union, then leaves. He is briefly drawn to Helmut Kohl and his idea of a “moral and spiritual turn” in the 1980s, then disappointed. And finally, in 2013, the AfD appears in the context of the euro crisis.

At the beginning, identity is not even the main issue for him.

“This country is blocked. This people has lost itself.”

He also talks about his children, about the fact that they were bullied at school because of who he is, about the nights spent trying to comfort them. And about what they tell him now:

“Dad, it hasn’t always been easy, but we’re proud of what you do.”

Then he shifts to something else. Demonstrations against him.

“The pure hatred on those faces. If they could get hold of me, they would tear me apart.”

The society of trust

The central idea in the interview revolves around a single concept: the Vertrauensgesellschaft, a society based on trust.

Höcke refers to Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde and his well-known theorem: the liberal state depends on conditions it cannot create itself.

The point is not particularly ideological at first. A functioning society depends on things like trust between people, shared norms, a common language, a sense of the collective. None of these can simply be produced by institutions.

From there, he draws his conclusion.

A society of trust takes time. Centuries, even. It develops through trial and error. What works is kept, what fails is abandoned. But all of that requires something basic: a population living together long enough to adjust to one another.

This is where his rejection of multiculturalism comes in. He makes the point in a slightly unexpected way, quoting Daniel Cohn-Bendit:

“Multicultural societies are fast, harsh, cruel, and lacking in solidarity.”

Then comes the broader diagnosis:

“Thirty years ago, as Germans, we did not have to worry when entering public space. Today, we do. Thirty years ago, schools worked. Today, we write incident reports. The cultural foundation is collapsing, and with it the foundation of freedom.”

For him, security is not mainly about policing. It is a consequence of shared trust. When that disappears, force cannot replace it.

This is the basis of his migration policy. A halt to non-European immigration. The removal of social benefits for people without legal status, reduced to what he describes as “bed, bread, soap.” And something he calls remigration.

He breaks that down into three groups. Those without legal status, who should be deported. Those who are culturally integrated, who stay. And a third group, the largest, where change would happen gradually, by reducing the country’s attractiveness rather than through mass expulsions.

The distinction matters. It does not make the policy less radical, but it does make it harder to simplify.

An inverted politics of memory

Another key part of his thinking has to do with memory.

Postwar Germany built much of its political identity around what is called Erinnerungskultur, a culture of memory centered on responsibility for Nazism and a continuous effort to confront that past. For a long time, this was broadly accepted. Today, it is increasingly questioned, not only by Höcke but also by some historians who worry that it has become too rigid to deal with the present.

Höcke uses a more technical German term, einseitige Vergangenheitsbewirtschaftung, which could be translated as a one-sided management or exploitation of the past. What he means is that guilt has become a political instrument.

He formulates it in a very direct way:

“When a people loses identification with its own history, it loses its capacity to exist as a state.”

And also:

“You cannot build a society of free citizens on a negative collective consciousness.”

He does not deny what he calls the Schattenseiten, the dark sides of history. He mentions them several times when speaking about Nazism. But he refuses the idea that they should be the only framework through which history is understood.

The most sensitive moment in this part of the interview concerns Dresden. The Allied bombing of February 1945, which killed tens of thousands of civilians.

Höcke has, in the past, taken part in commemorations organized by identitarian groups. He addresses this openly. He says he does not regret having been there, but adds that today he would choose a more “dignified” form, mentioning the Heidefriedhof cemetery, where he went two years earlier.

He describes a small monument representing a young girl, a symbol of the children killed, which was recently vandalized.

From this, he draws a broader conclusion:

“We need to keep alive what war is. And after the terrible wars of the twentieth century, we have had enough of war in all its forms.”

For him, German politics should be oriented toward reconciliation, toward understanding between peoples, and toward preserving peace.

The lesson of Westphalia

Höcke also openly presents himself as an admirer of Otto von Bismarck.

“I admire and venerate his legacy.”

This matters because Bismarck represents, in German political thought, a very specific approach. A realist approach, where foreign policy is about interests rather than moral missions.

Höcke develops this idea further by going back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which he describes as a kind of starting point for the European system.

The logic, as he explains it, is simple. War is part of human reality. But it should be contained. It should be declared formally, fought between states, and ended with a formal peace whose goal is to make former enemies into partners again.

This way of thinking is close to that of Carl Schmitt, even if Höcke does not explicitly cite him.

“Today, we call it the war on terror or peacekeeping missions. But it is still war. Just presented differently.”

He applies this framework to the war in Ukraine. He is clearly opposed to German involvement, to arms deliveries, and to the idea of moving toward a war economy.

He even imagines a scenario in which Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Defense Minister Boris Pistorius would call for mobilization.

His answer is blunt:

“Many Germans would say: to be shot for this country, for this multicolored society? No, thank you.”

Post-parliamentarianism

Another important part of his argument concerns institutions.

Höcke uses the term Postparlamentarismus, post-parliamentarianism. What he is describing is a situation where formal democratic structures still exist, but their functioning has changed in practice.

In Thuringia, his party has the largest number of seats, but because of the Brandmauer, it is systematically excluded from power. Even positions that would normally go to the largest group, like the presidency of the parliament, have been denied to AfD candidates through coordinated voting by other parties.

For him, this is not a technical detail. It is a break with a fundamental democratic rule.

He extends this critique to the Verfassungsschutz, which he accuses of shifting from protecting the constitution to monitoring political opposition.

And more broadly, he lists what he sees as signs of an authoritarian drift: laws regulating online speech, such as the Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz or the European Digital Services Act; police searches linked to opinions expressed online; attempts to ban publications like Compact; calls for boycotts; what he sees as a politicized judiciary; and cases where individuals are prosecuted or excluded from the financial system, including figures like Martin Sellner.

“When I see all this, I am afraid.”

The homeland as a debt to one’s children

The final part of the interview returns to something more personal, but also more fundamental.

Höcke describes the homeland as something that is passed on. Something you receive, and something you owe.

“I want Germany to live. I want Germany to remain the homeland of my children, not just in name, but in substance.”

He goes further:

“If we become a minority in our own country, if we lose ourselves to the point where we can no longer pass on our culture, then this country will have no future.”

What he sees for Germany, he says, he also sees for Western Europe as a whole. He uses a strong word: Zivilisationsbruch. A civilizational rupture.

The term has its own history. It was used by Dan Diner to describe Auschwitz as a break in civilization. Höcke turns it around. For him, the rupture is not in the past. It is ahead.

In doing so, he places himself within a broader intellectual tradition, referring implicitly or explicitly to figures such as Maurice Barrès, Dominique Venner, and Roger Scruton.

The homeland, in this perspective, is not an ideology. It is a condition of existence.

Why this matters beyond Germany

At this point, a natural question arises. Why should any of this matter outside Germany?

One answer is legal. Björn Höcke is, today, one of the few European politicians to have been criminally convicted for the use of a slogan. Whatever one thinks of his positions, that precedent raises broader questions. Laws evolve. What is exceptional in one country can become less so over time.

Another answer is intellectual. The themes he raises are not specific to Germany. The erosion of trust, the role of memory, the transformation of war into moral confrontation, the closing of political systems, the idea of the nation as something inherited. These are debates that exist across Europe.

And then there is the media aspect.

Seventy thousand likes overnight. Tens of thousands of comments, many of them supportive. A level of attention that, in this case, surpassed even official interviews with the German chancellor.

Something is shifting. Not just politically, but in how political discourse circulates.

What is happening around Höcke is not only about Höcke.

For anyone who has followed the situation in their own country, some of these patterns may feel familiar. Institutions that monitor opposition more closely than governments. Expanding legal frameworks around speech. Political isolation strategies that grow as movements themselves grow.

None of this is uniquely German.

Reading Höcke today is not only about Germany. It may also be, in part, about what lies ahead elsewhere.

Photo : Filmkunstkollektiv

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Voxeuropa Herald is an initiative that shares the voices shaping Europe today: elected officials, essayists, philosophers, activists, artists and influencers. These portraits are collective responses to the crises shaking our Europe. Faced with the major upheavals of our times, Voxeuropa Herald gives a voice to those who, throughout Europe, share solutions and visions for the future. The message is clear : European realities call for European responses.

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Three days before the thirteenth annual symposium of the Institut Iliade, a La France insoumise MP wrote to the Interior Minister demanding it be shut down. Five months earlier, the administrative court had already struck down an identical order. The legal defeat has not discouraged its authors. It has simply laid bare what the procedure is now for. What Thomas Portes wanted to keep out of sight, the April 11 symposium put on full display: a European right in the midst of consolidation.

I. What the left tried to ban

The ritual of preemptive censorship

On April 8, 2026, Thomas Portes, MP for Seine-Saint-Denis, sent a letter to Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez and to the Paris Prefect of Police. He called for the administrative banning of the Institut Iliade’s annual symposium, scheduled for Saturday, April 11 at the Maison de la Chimie. The grounds he invoked are worth weighing carefully: “calls to hatred and racist remarks liable to be made there.”

Liable. That single word carries the entire argument. The point is not to sanction an act that has been committed, but an act that might be; not to prosecute speech that has been uttered, but speech attributed to the speakers before they have opened their mouths. This is a departure from the rule of law, which sanctions acts, in favor of a preemptive policing of opinions.

The maneuver is all the more revealing given its place in a losing legal sequence. In November 2025, the Paris administrative court struck down a prior ban targeting the Institut Iliade and ordered the state to pay court costs. The decision should have set a precedent. It changed nothing. Winning the legal battle is no longer the point. The point is to make the event, year after year, costly, stressful, politically exposed. The ban, however doomed in court, has become an instrument of ritual harassment. The procedure says a great deal about the balance of forces: the left has nothing left to oppose the right with but censorship and violence.

A program no one dares to read

What was an elected member of parliament so afraid the audience might hear? The program, published several weeks in advance, contains none of the signals that a procedure invoking “racist remarks” might reasonably be expected to cite. Antoine Dresse on liberties without institutions. Laurent Obertone on the medieval mindset as an inner resource. Alice Cordier, of the Collectif Némésis, on women’s liberties as a constant of European identity. Jean-Luc Coronel de Boissezon on academic freedom. Philippe Herlin on economic liberties. Thibault Mercier on the twilight of liberties. Jean-Yves Le Gallou closes the day on how to escape what he calls “anarcho-tyranny.”

A program in political philosophy. The morning begins with a fable, recited by an actor. Musicians play guitar, violin, bagpipes. The day closes at eight in the evening with a grand ball. Thomas Portes did not want to ban what was going to be said. He wanted to ban what was being built. The two are not the same.

II. What it saw anyway

Context: Quentin

One backdrop must be named, the one the left-wing press erases entirely: the murder of Quentin, a nationalist student, killed by hard-left militants close to La France insoumise. The investigation has identified six suspects.

The event had its effect: it woke people up and drew them in. The stands saw new crowds. Young people with little prior political involvement enrolled in the institute’s training cycles. And when an MP from the party whose name the alleged killers invoked demanded the symposium be banned three days before it took place, the gesture was received for exactly what it was: a provocation, and an admission.

An audience no one wants to describe

The French press carefully avoids describing the people crowding Rue Saint-Dominique from half past nine in the morning, a stone’s throw from the National Assembly. An audience mostly of men and women, well-dressed, with a large share under forty. In the hallways one hears French, Italian, English, Spanish, Serbian, German. A Norwegian publisher runs a stand devoted to the writings of Fridtjof Nansen.

A cultural front taking shape

What changes everything is the international composition of the event. Five years ago, Junge Freiheit would not have sent two reporters to Rue Saint-Dominique, Compact would not have been there, and Benedikt Kaiser would not have been signing, in Paris, the French translation of his Gramscian analysis of the AfD’s success, six months after it came out in Halle.

Things have changed. Martin Sellner’s book Remigration sits on the stands in several translations. Jean-Yves Le Gallou, former MEP and a historic figure of GRECE and later of Iliade, has just published Remigration: Pour l’Europe de nos enfants, conceived as a “companion volume” to Sellner’s book. The preface is signed by Sellner himself. The exchange is no longer bilateral; it has become circular. Books travel, authors write each other’s prefaces, ideas are translated in real time.

The many structures involved no longer merely watch one another; they interpenetrate. This articulation is precisely the anchor point that a part of the European right has been looking for: a physical space where different sensibilities meet face to face: traditional Catholics, pagans of the Nouvelle Droite, liberal-conservatives, identitarians, nationalists. An intellectual ferment rather than an orthodoxy. Paris, once a year, plays that role.

The event’s cultural depth confirms that this is not merely a political platform. Paintings in the corridors, theater performed in pieces on the main stage, traditional music between sessions. Alongside the symposium, the announcement of a new “Nietzsche” training cycle for young Europeans was met with strong enthusiasm, a sign that intellectual demand is outrunning existing offerings.

The lineage is long. A guest interviewed by Junge Freiheit summed up the moment in two words: he spoke of “GRECE families” and noted that the present-day audience is “essentially the third generation.” Founded in 1968 by Alain de Benoist and a handful of others, among them Dominique Venner, to whose memory the Iliade was dedicated in 2014, GRECE was more than a circle. It was a school. Its first students are now between seventy and eighty-five. Their grandchildren, the people one saw on Saturday, are its living embodiment.

On the podium : Sellner, Boutin, Royer

Late in the afternoon, the roundtable “Confiscated liberties, redoubled commitment,” moderated by Pierre Larti, brought together Martin Sellner, the leading figure of the Austrian Identitarians; Nicolas Boutin, journalist at Valeurs actuelles; and Matisse Royer, founder of Voxeuropa. Sellner spoke in French, with a lightness of touch. He recounted the bans, the no-platformings, the bank account closures (116) he has faced in Austria and Germany. He called them his “decorations.” He closed, to general laughter, with a line that captures his method: “Danke, Antifa!” Repression, he explained, regularly misses its mark: it designates, it aggregates, it makes visible.

Boutin brought the perspective of a French conservative press that has been steadily rearming itself intellectually. Royer closed the roundtable with this intervention:

“If millions came, then millions will leave. If Spain lived seven centuries under Muslim rule, then nothing is lost. Europeans once ruled the world. We are conquerors, and we will become again what we are. And we will never apologize for it.”

The line places remigration, a term coined in France and theorized politically by Sellner, within a long arc of time. Seven centuries to reconquer Spain: the Reconquista is no rhetorical flourish, it is a reminder of what Europeans have done, and therefore of what they can do. The refusal to apologize closes the thought on an ontological register. One does not apologize for having been a people. One owns it, or one ceases to be one.

A telling absence

One final element deserves attention: the near-total absence of the Rassemblement National. It points to the enduring misunderstanding between the Nouvelle Droite and France’s main opposition party. Inside the RN, the intellectuals are thought too abstract, too elitist. Inside the Nouvelle Droite, the RN’s dédiabolisation is read as a dilution.

The takeaway is this. The Iliade symposium does not operate as an annex of any party. It operates as a school, independent and free. Which is exactly what makes it, in the eyes of its adversaries, a more formidable object than any electoral machine. An electoral machine can be beaten at the polls. A school can only be beaten by a better school.

What the day made visible

An MP writes to a prefect asking that a symposium be banned. The ban does not happen. The symposium takes place. Fifteen hundred people attend. Journalists from a dozen countries cross paths. Books in four or five languages change hands. What the Portes attempt meant to keep out of sight, it ended up confirming: that the space of European thought has quietly reorganized itself while the left exhausted itself demanding dissolutions. That there now exists, between Paris, Halle, Vienna, Milan, Madrid and Budapest, an institutional, editorial and human fabric that makes the old strategy of national isolation obsolete. That the “intellectual right,” whose death has been announced every five years since 1980, is in 2026 in better structural shape than it has been in a generation. There is no finer ratification than the one an adversary gives against his will.

Voxeuropa Herald is an initiative that shares the voices shaping Europe today: elected officials, essayists, philosophers, activists, artists and influencers. These portraits are collective responses to the crises shaking our Europe. Faced with the major upheavals of our times, Voxeuropa Herald gives a voice to those who, throughout Europe, share solutions and visions for the future. The message is clear: European realities call for European responses.

Source photo : Junge Freiheit

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Voxeuropa Herald is an initiative that shares the voices shaping Europe today: elected officials, essayists, philosophers, activists, artists and influencers. These portraits are collective responses to the crises shaking our Europe. Faced with the major upheavals of our times, Voxeuropa Herald gives a voice to those who, throughout Europe, share solutions and visions for the future. The message is clear : European realities call for European responses.

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In the early hours of the 20 of March a group of at least 5 leftist extremists broke into a Czech arms manufacturer LLP Holdings, stole classified documents doused the production hall in petrol and set it all alight, causing €16 million in damages.

Their reasoning ?

They believed the manufacturer worked in cooperation with the Israeli arms manufacturer Elbit systems, this was not at all the case. The manufacturer made drones solely for the European market, many of these drones actually ended up being used by Ukrainian forces. Which the terror suspects were ironically vocal advocates for. Here you can see the mind virus taking hold over 2 years. Destroying your own beauty is the ultimate form of leftist liberation after all.

The supposed Berlin connection

The German Federal Government provides the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation with

tens of millions of euros annually. In 2024, this support amounted to over 71 million euros. This foundation has long been active in the Czech Republic as well, where it provides financial support to organisations that pursue an extreme left-wing and radical internationalist agenda.

Among past recipients of these funds was the non-profit publishing organisation Druhá směna, where one of the suspected terrorists, transgender, Egyptian-born, Saudi-raised Youssef M served as an active writer. The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation was also reportedly involved in the organisation’s establishment.

Another suspect, Anežka B, was an avid supporter of foundation-funded events, first promoting them publicly at the age of just 15. Her trajectory illustrates a clear and disturbing path of radicalisation that culminated in the attack of 20 March.

The fact that German public funds contribute in the long term to building an ideological breeding ground for radicalisation on the territory of the Czech Republic, from which the suspects for this serious violent crime also emerged, must not be ignored.

In a letter to the President of the Bundestag Julia Klöckner, Czech member of Parliament and chairman of the Svobodni party Libor Vondráček wrote

“I consider it unacceptable that funds from German taxpayers – even indirectly – contribute to the fanaticisation of young people, which in extreme cases can escalate into violence against private property and the security of citizens of a sovereign Member State of the European Union.

Therefore, Madam President, as the highest representative of the German Parliament, I urgently ask you to support or initiate the following steps in the Bundestag :

• An interpellation of the Federal Government regarding existing control mechanisms and oversight of the foreign activities of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and other political foundations,
• A tightening of the rules for granting public subsidies so that these funds do not end up with institutions that promote radicalism and hateful ideologies or justify violence,
• The enforcement of full transparency of financial flows between German state foundations and organisations operating in the Czech Republic and other neighbouring countries.”

The fire in Pardubice has been extinguished, but the political flames are only beginning to spread. Whether Berlin responds with transparency or deflection will reveal much about their intentions. If the unholy CDU-SPD alliance truly values “European solidarity,” it must prove it by ending the supposed export of radicalism that undermines the very democracies it claims to defend.

Czech authorities will pursue justice through the courts.

Prague’s political class must now pursue justice through its allies.

By Martin Kuziel

Source photos : Oleksandr Yaremenko - CTK

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Long hailed as a model of openness, Sweden is continuing its migration shift. The government has presented a bill that could mark a profound break: from now on, foreigners residing in the country will be required to demonstrate that they lead an “honest life,” under threat of losing their residence permits.

Migration Minister Johan Forssell sums up the spirit of the bill: “Respecting the law is not enough; one must also contribute positively to society.” This approach reflects a desire to consider the individual as a whole—through civic and social behavior, not just legal compliance. It expands the grounds for expulsion to a series of behaviors previously considered peripheral: unpaid debts, social welfare fraud, undeclared work, or failure to comply with administrative decisions. The government also proposes that residence permits could be revoked in additional situations. If adopted by Parliament, these changes would come into effect on July 13.

The bill signals a subtle yet major shift: the right to remain on the territory would no longer depend solely on administrative status or the absence of criminal convictions, but on a broader evaluation of behavior. In other words, long-term residence in a country would no longer be a given; it would be an implicit commitment: to follow the rules, but also not to burden the system or evade it.

In a Europe facing continuous migratory flows and increasing pressure on social systems, this logic is gaining ground: rights imply concrete and verifiable duties.

The notion of an “honest life” is deliberately broad. And this is precisely what gives it weight. Member of Parliament Ludvig Aspling, linked to the Sweden Democrats, acknowledges this: statements or attitudes alone are not enough, but they can serve as early warning signals, particularly regarding extremism.

This flexibility paves the way for a more proactive migration policy, allowing authorities to act upstream rather than after serious violations occur. It also signals a shift toward a broader, more political assessment of a foreigner’s presence on national territory.

Sweden is no longer an isolated case. From Denmark to Italy, and the Netherlands in between, European states are gradually tightening their frameworks. Across the continent, mass immigration systems are being questioned, and right-leaning governments are just beginning to attempt corrective measures. Behind this lies an implicit redefinition of migration policy: beyond technical adjustments, the signal is clear—residence in a national territory is once again revocable, not an irreversible trajectory.

This development responds to a demand for coherence in the face of migratory pressure.

For critics, it opens a gray zone, where the boundary between administrative fault, social behavior, and severe sanction—expulsion—becomes blurred. By raising the question of an “honest life,” Sweden is not merely adjusting its migration policy; it is redefining the terms of the implicit contract between the state and those it receives, beyond a simple legal definition. In a tense European context, this evolution could well foreshadow further, deeper shifts in the years ahead.

The notion of an “honest life” can be read as a first step toward the logic of remigration, comparable to the concept theorized by and other New Right European thinkers: organizing returns and limiting the settlement of populations deemed insufficiently integrated. This does not rely solely on criminal law but on a broader understanding of what real integration entails. Within this framework, Sweden is experimenting with a graduated and conditional mechanism, allowing authorities to revoke residence permits based on migrants’ social, economic, or legal behavior. This device illustrates how certain European policies aim to combine integration, control, and gradual return. And this is only the beginning.

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I. The facts : a lynching on the sidelines of a controversial conference

On Thursday, February 12, 2026, around 6 p.m. in Lyon, LFI MEP Rima Hassan—a prominent pro-Palestinian figure—gave a conference on EU–Middle East relations. The Némésis collective had organized a peaceful protest: a few of their activists unfurled a banner reading “Get out, Islamo-leftists.”

Quentin, 23, a mathematics student with no criminal record, was there to support Némésis’s action—not as an official “security agent,” according to his family and his lawyer Me Fabien Rajon, but simply to defend his convictions peacefully. A close friend, Baptiste, told Frontières : “Every week he’d go out to bring food and some human warmth to the homeless on the streets of Lyon. Quentin was genuinely virtuous, a very noble soul, a true Frenchman.” He added: “What drove him every day was his faith and his desire to serve. He came to help those brave young women from Némésis. On the other side, the Antifa mob was clearly looking for a fight.”

Five young women from Némésis were assaulted by far-left militants near the event. At the same time, others were being chased by around thirty Antifas. Between 6:30 and 6:40 p.m., on Rue Victor-Lagrange (about 500 m away), Quentin found himself isolated, thrown to the ground, and lynched with kicks to the head by a gang of hooded militants wearing reinforced gloves. He was rushed to hospital with severe brain injuries and placed in an induced coma. Amateur footage shows about twenty people in the street, a motionless man on the pavement, and an outburst of pure hatred and violence. The far-left militants kept beating the unconscious man lying on the ground.

On Saturday, February 14, his death was confirmed. An investigation was opened for “aggravated fatal blows” (in a group, with a weapon, faces concealed). On site, Némésis and several activists reported the presence of Jacques-Elie Favrot, parliamentary assistant to LFI MP Raphaël Arnault and spokesperson for the “La Jeune Garde” group, dissolved in 2025. According to a witness to the lynching, this assistant was identified as responsible and described as the ringleader of the attack, reportedly urging the militants on with words like: “Come on guys, let’s kick their asses.” Also mentioned are Adrian Besseyre, a highly active member of La Jeune Garde Lyon who reportedly did an internship at the National Assembly with Raphaël Arnault, and Lelio Le Besson, a member of La Jeune Garde Lyon’s security detail. For his part, Jean-Luc Mélenchon has called this violence-dissolved movement an “ally.” La Jeune Garde’s security service is said to have been regularly used by LFI, including at this Rima Hassan conference.

In their second statement on February 14, the family denounced an organized gang murder, a premeditated ambush. The video makes it clear: scouting, accomplices, numerical superiority, masks, relentless blows on an immobile body. The family stressed that Quentin “defended his convictions without violence.”

The judicial case is extremely sensitive and could reach certain MPs for possible incitement or complicity (Art. 23 of the 1881 Press Law). A criminal investigation must be opened swiftly against far-left MPs. This type of murder can carry life imprisonment when committed by several people acting as an organized gang (Article 221-4 of the Penal Code).

Part of the radical left is downplaying this assassination, relativizing it by pointing out that Quentin was “far-right,” a “Nazi.” Blast journalist Camille Stineau declared: “You institutional left parties are perfectly happy to have Antifas around your events to protect you from the fascists. But the day the fight gets a bit too rough and a Nazi dies, you throw the Antifas under the bus? Go fuck yourselves.” Blast received €316,000 in public funding in 2024. On social media, many—often anonymous—accounts have celebrated this assassination. Moderate left and centrist figures have condemned the tragedy without explicitly naming those responsible. Several posted their messages with comments disabled or limited. Commentators also recall that Emmanuel Macron backed Raphaël Arnault’s candidacy against the National Rally to “fight the far right.” They further point out that during the campaign in the relevant constituency, the RN had sidelined several activists deemed “too” radical by its leadership.

II. Analysis : a tragedy that exposes unpunished far-left terrorism

Far-left violence is not a marginal phenomenon. This tragedy is not isolated; it lays bare a serious political problem that can no longer be brushed aside. The entire history of the far left can be summed up here: hit those weaker than you, in numbers, prepared and armed. According to the Observatory of Political Violence, far-left violence in France rose 68% between 2024 and 2025. In 2013 the entire political class immediately condemned Clément Méric’s death, with the institutional right once again showing particular zeal—even though Clément Méric had attacked a right-wing activist. What about today for the nationalist militant murdered by Antifas?

For years, whistleblowers have been warning about far-left terrorism. These warnings go unheeded, and now we have this tragedy. It will keep happening until the antifascist movement is treated as terrorist. La France Insoumise and the entire left legitimize this violence and bear moral responsibility for this assassination as well as for the many other attacks on innocents. Many right-wing MPs ignore warnings from their activist base; some even despise them, and others support repression against our political groups in order to “de-demonize” themselves. The authorities do nothing to correct this grave democratic failure or to protect innocent activists.

Today we are paying the heaviest price. Quentin is dead. Quentin was innocent. A Catholic who converted his father—former Action Française activist, France’s oldest political formation—and sympathizer of Academia Christiana, a Catholic training institute, he had committed himself to the common good. Quentin came to defend the women of Némésis. To defend their freedom of expression, their right to demonstrate against a conference by the Islamo-leftist Rima Hassan, a symbol of anti-white hatred sitting in the European Parliament. Némésis activists face violence from left-wing men at every action: insults, death threats, beatings, strangling. Quentin wanted to say no to this violence at his own level. More broadly, for years across Europe the far left has been smashing, beating and killing—with the tacit or open support of the entire left. We saw it with Maja and the left’s backing in the European Parliament.

Right-wing activists bear no moral responsibility for the violence they face alone. They are in a permanent state of legitimate self-defense against unchecked, uncontrolled violence. Quentin died for who he was, for what we represent: the fight against mass immigration, against wokism, love of family and love of our land. We carry the torch and we will keep watch over our own, as Quentin did. In the face of intimidation and complicit silence, we choose loyalty and solidarity among Europeans who refuse to vanish into indifference.

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Behind the polished image of Scandinavian cyberactivism lies a darker network of influence. Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi, co-founder of the famous file-sharing site The Pirate Bay, is now accused of facilitating the creation of one of the most sophisticated digital ecosystems linked to the global far-left movement. Through his companies Ab Stract and Privactually Ltd, Sunde allegedly provides the technological infrastructure for websites associated with Antifa and its European affiliates, enabling anonymous coordination, doxxing campaigns, and transnational fundraising.

Investigations have revealed that Sunde’s anonymization service, Njalla, launched in 2017 and marketed as a privacy tool, is often used to hide the operators of extremist websites. These include platforms such as Antifa.se in Sweden, Redox.dk in Denmark, Nazifrei.org in Switzerland, and Antifainfoblatt.de in Germany, all accused of publishing private information about journalists, politicians, and right-wing activists.

In several cases, these campaigns have directly targeted members of Junge Tat, a patriotic youth movement in Switzerland, and other activists in the European identity movement. Their members have been subjected to harassment, dismissal from their jobs, and threats as a result of coordinated doxxing operations. According to Tobias Lingg, the leader of Junge Tat, the publications on these sites have “led to widespread harassment and targeted social destruction,” a pattern now documented in several European countries.

Beyond Scandinavia, Sunde’s infrastructure connects these European Antifa groups to American far-left networks. The US, under new counterterrorism guidelines, has classified Antifa as a domestic terrorist organization, paving the way for sanctions against individuals and entities that provide “material support” to its operations. If Sunde’s companies are found guilty of hosting or processing payments for these groups, they could be subject to US counterterrorism legislation.

The network is transnational in scope. In Germany, for example, Antifainfoblatt.de is identified by authorities as a propaganda and coordination center for Antifa’s militant branches, supporting fundraising efforts for convicted extremists such as members of the “Hammer Gang.” Read our article by Martin Kuziel.

In Denmark, the website Redox.dk continues to publish the personal data of political opponents, despite previous convictions for defamation. And in Sweden, Antifa.se has repeatedly disclosed the personal details of elected representatives of the Sweden Democrats party, with Njalla protecting the real operators of the site from law enforcement.

According to the same investigations, Ab Stract and 31173 Services AB act as Internet service providers for Njalla, allowing these sites to remain online independently of traditional hosting providers who cooperate with the police and the courts. Financial transactions, meanwhile, go through the offshore company Privactually Ltd, based in Cyprus, an arrangement that further obscures responsibility and ownership.

Several independent investigations also indicate that the anonymizing infrastructure linked to Njalla may have been used to host illegal content or conceal illicit activities on the dark web. The lack of cooperation from some of these structures with the authorities fuels concerns about the use of these tools by extremist or criminal networks.

Sunde’s personal history adds to the controversy. Already ordered to pay more than $11 million to Hollywood studios for copyright infringement, he reportedly has unpaid debts exceeding 128 million Swedish kronor to major media groups. His assets are reportedly protected by trustees, shell companies, and even testamentary clauses preventing their seizure, raising further questions about the financial opacity surrounding his businesses.

The implications go beyond political activism. With Antifa now designated as a terrorist entity in the US, European policymakers are under increasing pressure to examine how digital infrastructure based in the EU may facilitate extremist activities abroad. Some Swedish parliamentarians, including members of the Sweden Democrats party, have already proposed motions at the national and European levels to consider similar classifications.

Faced with these revelations, Europe can no longer ignore the reality of the danger posed by networks linked to the radical far left. What presents itself as an “anti-fascist” movement has, in fact, transformed itself into a transnational structure capable of monitoring, harassing, and destabilizing its political opponents under the guise of activism. The American example marks a turning point. Europe must learn from this: as long as these networks benefit from technical infrastructure, opaque funding, and political tolerance, they will continue to undermine the stability and internal security of the continent. It is time for European authorities to take a clear stance: ban Antifa structures, as the United States has done, and dismantle the digital networks that allow them to operate in the shadows.

This article is based on the investigative work of Swedish journalist , who alerted the Trump administration to the anti-fascist circles in Sweden and the threat they pose to Swedish and European democracy.

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Ilaria Salis, an Italian MEP for the Green and Left Alliance won her mandate while sitting in a Hungarian prison. After being charged with multiple counts of attempted battery causing life-threatening bodily harm committed “in the framework of a criminal organisation”

It is suspected that in February 2023, Ilaria Salis along with 14 other co-conspirators as members of Hammerbande, a violent “anti-fascist” gang that uses melee and chemical agents to attack people it deems political enemies, arrived in Budapest in a premeditated manner in order to incite fear through violent methods in whom they thought wanted to commemorate soldiers involved in the defence of Hungary in the Second World War.

The majority of the anti-fascist terrorists who carried out the attacks in Budapest two years ago were German (but there were also Italians, an Albanian and a Syrian) They were all allegedly part of, the Hammerbande “Hammer Gang” terrorist group, which was founded in Leipzig in 2015, and even by communist standards their tactics were brutal.

Here are a few examples of their terrorism, all credit to the Austrian Heimatkurier portal.

On July 4, 2016, a local organizer of the then-operating PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, or Patriots Against the Islamization of the West) in Leipzig was beaten with hammers in front of his apartment.

On October 30, 2018, an activist from the Junge Nationalisten organization in Wurzen was so badly beaten that his spine was broken in several places, his kneecap was broken, and he suffered 14 other injuries. He was taken to the hospital by ambulance in a life-threatening condition.

On January 7, 2019, Frank Magnitz, the state leader of the AfD in Bremen and the party’s representative in the Bundestag, was attacked in the city center of Bremen by cowardly antifa, who deliberately hit him on the head with batons. They wanted to kill him, but fortunately for the politician, a worker passing by distracted the terrorists. Magnitz was also hospitalized with life-threatening injuries.

On January 18, 2019, about twenty people were ambushed at a train station in Dessau-Rosslau as they were heading to an event commemorating the four waves of British and American bombings between February 13 and 15, 1945, in which some 200,000 innocent civilians were burned alive with phosphorus bombs. The beatings left one man with a brain hemorrhage, a broken knee and ankle, and another with a staple in his face.

On February 15, 2020, three men and a 15-year-old boy were also attacked by Antifa at the train station in Wurzen, also coming from an event commemorating the victims of the Dresden bombing, and several others were seriously injured.

On July 11, 2020, Antifa members posing as parcel delivery-drivers in Dresden beat a right-wing man to death with hammers.

On March 11, 2021, terrorists posing as police officers rang the doorbell of the chairman of the Junge Nationalisten organization, Paul Rzehaczek. The young man, a father of three, who answered the door was tied up and his ankles were broken with hammers so that he would never be able to work as a driving instructor again. He was also sprayed with tear gas and doused with chlorine as he left.

On May 28, 2021, a right-wing football fan was attacked in Erfurt with the same trick. He was tied up, his legs were broken, and he was doused with chlorine, just like his wife, who was in her third trimester.

On January 12, 2023, two members of the small right-wing party Neue Stärke, or New Strength, were brutally attacked in Erfurt. This time, the terrorists also used an axe, one of the victims suffered a severe skull fracture.

In addition, they broke into the homes of right-wing people in their absence on several occasions, destroying them and making them uninhabitable.

The real question is, how could they pull this off?

Pulled from an article by Ágoston Balázs

“The question arises as to how the terrorists knew the addresses of their victims. Well, the criminals were integrated into the German state organization. For example, an employee of the Leipzig city hall, Henry Aulich, had access to a lot of personal data as a legal administrator, and since he himself was a member of the terrorist gang, he misused it. Aulich was also in contact with a communist member of the Saxony state parliament, Juliane Nagel. But the SPD Interior Minister of the recently defeated German government, Nancy Faeser, also openly sympathized with antifa, so she can be classified as a psychic accessory to crime.”

Ilaria Salis was released from custody last May with a bail of 16 million forints (about €40.000), placed under criminal supervision and after her election the coercive measures against her were lifted. Ilaria Salis and the left-wing press, criticized Hungarian prison conditions and authorities, they portray her as a victim, deny the evidence and of her case she states:

“I know that I am on the right side of history and I do not want to be convicted for my political views.“

This is not someone who wants discussion. Her stance is clear: she is not a democratic actor. She should not have immunity and should face the full force of Hungarian law. The EU has justified and endorsed her alleged crimes by giving her immunity; we cannot stand for this!

Source: https://demokrata.hu/vilag/ideje-meregteleniteni-956716/

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About the authors :

Martin Kuziel serves as the International Relations for the Czech party Svobodní and a member of the NGO Voxeuropa.

Voxeuropa is a patriotic organization at the European level. It functions as a media outlet, a network, and a think tank. Its initiative works towards building a European metapolitics and strengthening cooperation among the continent’s political decision-makers.

On September 10 in Paris, the anger over taxes that had been brewing on social media could have brought people together across the political divide. But as always, the far left seized on the opportunity, turning popular discontent into a militant outlet. The right, meanwhile, did nothing. It simply observed. The result: the streets occupied by the same people and anger that only benefited its opponents.

This episode is part of a toxic political climate. The Bayrou government fell after the National Assembly rejected the budget. Sébastien Lecornu, appointed Prime Minister, embodies nothing but empty continuity: just another interchangeable bourgeois centrist, symbolizing the sterility of the system. In this political vacuum, the streets have become a battlefield—and it is controlled by the left.

According to the Ministry of the Interior, “Bloquons tout” brought together 197,000 participants, 800 actions, 675 arrests, 549 police custody cases, and 34 injured law enforcement officers. These figures appear massive, but they mask a simple reality: only the far left drove this mobilization.

In the early afternoon, several thousand people had already gathered at Place de la République: Palestinian flags, undocumented migrant groups, naked migrants surrounded by punks with dogs. It was a grotesque, folkloric scene, where unrefined petty bourgeoisie mingled with pot-bellied communist activists. At Châtelet, the usual leftist routine unfolded: burning trash cans, bottle throwing, anti-police and pro-Palestinian slogans. In short, the same actors, the same scenes.

But it was in the evening, at Porte des Lilas, that the spectacle took on another dimension. There, we saw organized violence. Dozens of activists methodically erected barricades. A huge blaze consumed trash cans, electric batteries, and street furniture. A 20-year-old woman even set about burning a bus shelter—as if burning a glass shelter could bring down the state. Stupidity elevated to a political act.

The firefighters who came to put out the fire were surrounded and threatened by a dozen young people. The arrival of hundreds of riot police allowed them to be cleared away. Then the usual mechanics kicked in: mortars, tear gas, LBDs. The far left, for their part, retreated in scattered order, hiding in parking lots or stores, only to reappear and throw bottles. A guerrilla war in the gutters, led by excited marginalized individuals.

In this chaos, the absurdity was total. The far left struck at random, as did the CRS. I paid the price: isolated, far from the clashes, I was hit with a baton. Such is the tactical genius of the police: strike those who are not participating and let those who are setting fires get away. Talking to some of the CRS officers, you could sense their dismay: overwhelmed, they were mainly picking up projectiles and doing some screening.

Beyond the images of violence, one reality stands out: the radical left has managed to organize a militant youth movement. It is organized, ready for confrontation, and gives the left a permanent lever of pressure.

The right, on the other hand, is not in a position of strength in this area. It has no mobilized youth and no street strategy. With the exception of a few pockets—recently in Vienna around the issue of remigration—it remains invisible. It clings to the idea that the ballot box is enough, even as the left occupies the streets and imposes its agenda by force.

The lesson is clear: the left knows that the streets are a political weapon. If the right does not learn this lesson in turn, if it does not conquer the terrain, it will lose. Not only the elections, but the cultural battle and the future. Because one thing is certain: in the streets as in politics, absence always comes at a price. And on September 10, the right once again chose absence.

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